The n o t ion of s y m bolizability is taken as the second requisite of comp u t a tion (the first being 'a l g o r i t h m i z a b i l i t y '), and it is shown that symbols, qua symbols, are not symbolizable. This has farreaching consequences for the computational study of language and for Al-research in language understanding. The representation hypothesis is formulated, and its various assumptions and goals are examined. A research strategy for the computational study of natural language u n d erstanding is outlined.
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Introduction: algorithms and symbolic representation
The algorithm is without doubt t h e fundamental concept in com puter science. Problems that can be solved by computer are all algorithmic: they can be presented on a form which invites a di vision of the overall problem into constituent parts, each of which can be solved sequentially and deterministically. When the last constituent problem is solved the overall problem is solved.
To get a computer to solve a problem, however, its constituent parts must be s y m h o l l z a b l e : they must be put on a form which is accessible to the computer. This precondition is summed up under the rubric 'representation'.
The inescababillty of these two preconditions is never in doubt.
However, doubts have recently been raised with respect to the value of the comparison that is often made, explicitly or implic itly, between the problem solving capacities of men and machines, and in particular with respect to the role allegedly played by representation as the constitutive feature of those capacities.
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Understanding natural language i s among the problems whose s o lu tio n has been expected to be a c c e s s ib le through computer simula tio n , p r e c is e ly on the assumption o f a common rep resen tation al ba sis fo r the problem so lv in g c a p a c itie s o f men and machines.
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The representation hypothesis
The topic of the present paper, thus loosely outlined. Is s y m b o l i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , in general as well as more specifically with respect to the role it plays in computational linguistics. Init ially, the notion of representation can be presented as a simple formula:
(1) a R b, which reads: 'a represents b'.
Representation is the name of a relation holding between two ent ities. The logical properties of the relation are usually taken to be i r r e f l e x i v i t y , i n t r a n s i t i v i t y , and a s y m m e tr y . Apart from these logical ones, R has properties sometimes summed up by say ing that a s t a
n d s f o r , c o m p l ie s w i t h , r e f e r s t o , s y m b o l i s e s , d e n o t e s , d e p i c t s , d e s i g n a t e s , c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h b.
The logical properties of the entities between which representa tion holds are more difficult to characterize briefly. Let us as sume, initially, that a is a physical entity, whereas b is typologically unspecified. We return to this issue below.
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In relation to (1) we can formulate an overall hypothesis, the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s , which says:
(2) All intelligent behaviour presupposes the formula (1).
Ultimately, this hypothesis aims to explain how such systems as Miller (1984) called 'informavores', can function as autonomous entities in larger physical environments, which they both affect and are affected by.
-120 -
The a d eq u a cy o f t h e fo r m u la
The formulation (1) invites the view that representation is a contextfree phenomenon, and that it eludes situationally condi tioned interpretation. This is incorrect. Already C.S. Peircewho in this connection can be considered one of the founding fathers of representation theory -insisted on the decisive in fluence that situation and context has on the interpretation of a sign. And perhaps even more importantly, he insisted that even the recognition of a physical entity as a sign presupposed back ground, interpretation, and what he called 'semiosis' or -as we shall say -'the semiotic process': the process by which there is created in an observer a mental correlate -Peirce's 'interpretant' -of a physical phenomenon which, in virtue of this process, now becomes a sign o f its object, b, to the observer. (CP 2.227-9; Hookway, 1985:118-144) . From this perspective, nothing is a sign 'in i t s e l f . A sign is c r e a t e d -through the semiotic process. So the formula (1) can be amended to: This means that an internal representation of b has been created in 0, 'corresponding to' the physical sign, a. This internal rep resentation, according to Peirce, is itself a sign, for which a new interpretant can be created by a recursive application of the semiotic process, and so on, ad infinitum. By way of continuation of the discussion of the logical properties of the entities be tween which R holds, we get a glimpse here of a systematic vacil lation in the conception of a in the formula: a can either be re garded as the p h y s i c a l s i g n which represents b; or else a can be understood as the c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e which has been created in 0 by virtue of O's taking a as a sign for b.
If a in this way can be thought of as either a physical or a men tal phenomenon, b must be so conceived as well. It causes no trouble to entertain the idea that physical entities can be rep resented. Nor does it cause trouble to entertain the idea that mental or abstract phenomena can be represented. There would seem, therefore, to be no trouble in accepting that meaning can be represented, no matter whether meaning is considered to be a mental phenomenon or not; cf. Searle 1 9 8 3 :Ch.8 for a general dis cussion of this point.
-121 -However, there does crop up a problem for computational linguis tics. On the view set out above, natural language is itself a representational system of interpreted symbols. At the same time, natural language is -for computational linguistists -a phenom enon that must itself be representable by computationally inter 121 Proceedings of NODALIDA 1987 pretable symbols. Here the intransitivity of the general repres entation relation becomes apparent. If it were transitive it would be child's play to construe natural language interfaces, since then, say, a string variable, a, would appear to represent whatever the content of a represents. But this is not how things work. If a in this instance represents anything apart from the sequence of alphanumerical characters that make up the string, then it is a location in the computer's memory, and not, for ex ample, the person that a string 'Tom Jones' is supposed to rep resent in a given context. From one perspective, then, computa tional representation of natural language is a special case of hypostasis.
Emerging from this discussion is the following startling fact: symbolic representation of an object, b, which i t s e l f has been interpreted as a symbol, is impossible! It can be a physical entity which -in other circumstances -c o u l d function as a sym bol. Or, it can be a mental phenomenon, an abstract object, a conceptual structure, in addition to whatever meaning is supposed to be.
This conclusion can be summed up in slogan fashion: concern, however, is the fact that it can be construed as the basis of the blpartltlon which characterizes previous attempts to Justify the representation hypothesis. 
S t a g e s a lo n g t h e p a th o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s
Attempts to justify the representation hypothesis come from many sides and from many more or less related academic disciplines.
The same can be said of the attempts to dismiss it as untenable, in particular and most recently by Winograd & Flores (1986).
Let us first dismiss one obvious possibility of discrediting the representation hypothesis. It criticizes any attempt to justify it that takes the form of clarifying (1), correctly claiming that justification of it should take the form of a clarification of (3). Clarification of (1) enters into the ultimate clarification of (3), but they are not the same; nor can clarification of (1) ever on its own count as justification of (2). I shall therefore assume, despite some evidence to the contrary, that everybody who has been seeking justification of (2) in the pursuit of clarifi cation of (1) in fact consciously, if tacitly, have been pursuing clarification of (3). Clarification of (3) could be regarded as an algorithmic problem for the ultimate solution of which a number of constituent prob lems have been formulated and described by various academic dis ciplines and scholarly persuasions. will discuss the items on the right-hand side. The items on the left-hand side will be considered in the form of a series of di gressions, which together will outline a research strategy for man-machine interaction in natural language.
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The constituent parts of the representation hypothesis
The list of constituent problems under (5) reads like a catalogue of a significant portion of Western philosophy, cognitive psych ology and epistemology in terms of substance. We shall be con cerned with them only from the computational point of view.
P h y s i c a l sy m b o l s y s t e m s
The bipartition mentioned above, and the vacillation in the con ception of a mentioned in 2.1., has led to a bifurcation of com putational research which both proceed from Newell's (1980; New ell & Simon 1976 ) account of a physical symbol system.
A physical symbol system is a system which subscribes to the laws of physics and which at any given time contains a set of struc- In addition, a physical symbol system comprises a set of process es that may create, change, destroy, and reproduce expressions. A physical symbol system, then, is a machine which produces a con tinuous, but continually changing, stream of symbol structures.
The precondition for the proper functioning of a physical symbol system is the notion of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as defined in computer science (Newell 1980:158) . Interpretation is there understood as the act of accepting as input an expression which represents a process, and then executing that process. Consider in this connection Picasso's famous reply to contempor ary criticism that his portrait, Gertrude, did not resemble Mrs.
Stein: "Don't worry. It will".
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The other direction seeks to explain the behaviour of informavores. This direction proceeds from cognitive psychology as much as from semiotics -it is known as 'cognitive s c i e n c e ' which sub sumes the more practical study of artificial intelligence. This was Newell's own main interest. He formulates the following hy pothesis :
y s i c a l Sym bol S y s te m H y p o t h e s i s
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a physical system to exhibit general intelligent action is that it be a physic al symbol system. Newell, 1980:170 'Necessary' and 'sufficient' in this connection mean, respective ly, that a system displaying what we would be prepared to call intelligent behaviour, will always upon closer inspection turn out to be a physical symbol system; and a physical symbol system of sufficient size will always be amenable to organization in such a way that it will display behaviour that we would be pre pared to call intelligent.
-127 -Clearly, interest in the properties of the symbol differs accord ing to which of the two directions one follows. In the first in stance we get an interest in the physical properties of symbols that may alleviate their e x t e n s i o n a l interpretation. In the sec ond, interest centres around the physical properties of symbols that will secure a particular i n t e n s i o n a l interpretation. In these terms the semiotic process can be seen as a complex series of steps whereby a particular physical object undergoes various internal processes (Newell calls them 'symbolic')/ whereby they are turned into meaningful structures, le structures that det ermine the symbol system's subsequent behaviour. It is important to realize that we have no immediate access to these structures, but only recognize them through the behaviour of the system. Consequently, we can only try to describe them on the basis of an abstraction from observed behaviour, in an appropriate formal no tation, if the need arises. In this way, both directions take a crucial interest in the physical properties of symbols which converges in the need for interpretation, extensional and
intensional. This leads to a digression on notational systems.
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D i g r e s s i o n : N o t a t i o n a l s y s t e m s
The fundamental property of a symbol is that it is an object man ifest to the senses. But -as Newell made clear -a symbol may be of a complex internal structure. This structure will in some cas es be amenable to description by means of a notational system, v i z those cases where the atomic parts of every symbol in the scheme constitute a set that satisfies the five requirements on notational systems formulated by Nelson Goodman (1976):
(7)(a) S y n t a c t i c d i s c r e t e n e s s : the decision whether some arbitra ry inscription belongs to a particular character and not another is deterministic; (c) U n a m h ig u ity : any character, as well as any inscription of any character, must be unambiguous; (d) S e m a n tic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n : the decision whether some ref erent of a particular inscription of any character belongs to one class of objects or another is deterministic; (e) S e m a n tic d i s j o i n t n e s s : no two characters in a notational system can have any referent in common. The interesting thing about these claims in our connection is that the alphabet satisfies them, whereas larger linguistic enti ties as a rule do not. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l P h o n e t i c s A s s o c i a t i o n notation in fact subsumes both types: a subset -used for phonem ic transcriptions -forms a notational system on the criteria above, the scheme as a whole -used for phonetic descriptiondoes not. Semantic networks, frames, etc., do not constitute not ational systems in the required sense, the propositional and predicate calculi do. And finally, all (procedural?) programming languages are notational systems. The parenthesis indicates some hesitation with respect to programming languages like Prolog and Lisp, and many tools specifically developed as system-building aids for knowledge engineering. And the hesitation is due to un certainty whether to regard such languages from the point of view of the programmer or from the point of view of the machine in making the decision. This ties in with the representation hier archy (see below, 3.2.1).
-131 -3.2. R e a so n in g a s s y tn b o lm a n ip u la tio n The symbol has become a mental code with psychological reality, a view which harks back to P e i r c e 's notion of 'interpretant'. How ever, we should be wary of identifying the two views, mainly be cause cognitive scientist are more interested than Peirce in ex The justification of this thesis is central to cognitive psychol ogy, for if it can be justified, Brentano's problem disappears. -135 -
..Reason, when w ee r e c k o n i t am ongst th e F a c u l t i e s o f t h e mind ... is n o t h in g b u t Reckoning ( t h a t i s A dding and S u b t r a c t i n g ) o f t h e C o n
The a c q u i s i t i o n and s t o r i n g o f k n ow led ge
The problem of how we a c q u ir e knowledge is at the epistemological core of Western philosophy. The problem of how we store it, once acquired, has only become of prime importance with the advent of computers, for if there is one thing on which all AI researchers agree it is that knowledge is extremely bulky. So, although the question of how best to feed the necessary information into the system is of concern to AI research in general, the burning ques tions are rather how to cope with its bulk without loss, and how to preserve it in a form suitable for rapid access and retrieval.
These problems crucially involve matters of representation, and specific k n ow led ge r e p r e s e n t a t i o n la n g u a g es have been developed to cope with them; cf. Waterman (1986:339-365 ) for a survey.
All attempts to create knowledge representation languages have assumed the validity of the k n ow led ge r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h y p o t h s i s ,
first explicitly formulated by Smith (1982) . It goes like this:
(10) Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be com prised of structural i n g r e d i e n t s that a) we as e x t e r n a l ob servers n a t u r a l l y take to r e p r e s e n t a
p r o p o s i t i o n a l account o f th e kn ow led ge th a t th e o v e r a l l p r o c e s s e x h i b i t s , and b)
independent of such external semantic attribution, play a Firstly, knowledge is r e p r e s e n t a b l e -or symbolizable -by s t r u c t u r a l elements. Accessible knowledge is assumed to be organized along previously determined patterns or principles. Only access ible knowledge determines behaviour.
Secondly, the representation of knowledge structured along these lines is assumed to consist of a collection of p r o p o s i t i o n s ,
which we can define here as truth-valued abstractions over states of affairs.
Thirdly, it is supposed to be n a tu r a l for us to see the situation in this light.
Fourthly -and in direct continuation of the digression on Brentano's problem above -it is the knowledge, structured in this way, that is the cause of the system's behaviour, and which we call intelligent because it reflects a reasonable 'awareness' of the accessible knowledge. Behaviour is the only external (or in terpersonal) evidence of accessible knowledge.
-136 -Finally, the triggering of rational behaviour is strictly formal, which means that it is not the propositional c o n t e n t as such which is the factor determining behaviour, but rather the struc tural occurrence of a particular configuration of truth-values in the overall knowledge structure. Pylyshyn's (1984) major aim is to escape this conclusion.
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No doubt all of these claims -and their consequences -merit discussion, but I will stick to just one, viz. that acquired knowledge is structured propositionally, and I will do so by way of yet another digression, on speech acts.
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D i g r e s s i o n : S p e e c h A c t s
To make a statement, to ask a question, to issue an order are the three major types of speech act, in the sense that most languages make distinctions in their grammatical systems between the types of sentences typically used to perform them: declarative, inter rogative, and imperative, respectively. Among these, declarative sentences have had a particularly prominent position in theoret ical discussions of semantics, because they are natural language expressions of streamlined, truth-valued propositions, and be cause theoretical semantics has often seen it as its major busi ness to account for the conditions that make a particular declar ative sentence true.
If, however, the major semantic business is to account for the circumstances in which a particular sentence can be said to have This, in barest outline, is the mechanism that Johnson-Laird (1983:Ch.l5) takes as the foundation of his theory of how we cre ate 'mental models' of our environment.
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The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e tw e e n la n g u a g e and r e a l i t y
If the representation hypothesis as formulated in (2) Discourse universes are private universes, but we can share one or more of them, in part. Long married couples -who are often held to be capable of wordless communication -will, in this jar gon, share a large portion of their overall universe of dis course. Universes of discourse may be large and small, and may be more or less densely populated. We can operate on the basis of more than one universe of discourse at the same time, and we can shift from one to another with perfect ease between conversations and even during conversations. And lastly, universes of discourse are intentional, in Searle's (1983: 1) sense of *intentionality':
Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world. with Identitive, generic and qualitative features (determining definiteness, specificness, certain aspects of conditionality, and referent typology), whereas shifts between universes of discourse are typically associated with presentative and parti tive features (determining discourse 'scope', various aspects of definite and indefinite quantification, and other aspects of con ditionality). The conditionality of referential expressions is the general mechanism for establishing the 'laws' that hold in a universe of discourse.
On this view, an utterance becomes a sym ptom of the state of the speaker's current universe of discourse, where 'symptom' is in tended in the technical sense of Lyons (1977:108) as ' a sign or signal which indicates to the receiver that the sender is in a particular state'. It is incumbent on the receiver, on the basis of his interpretation of the symptom, to gain insight in the state, perhaps to adapt his own universe of discourse accord ingly, or to try to persuade the speaker to revise his. Mutual understanding can, under the same view, be regarded as a progressional striving towards the greatest possible congruence between the current discourse universes of speaker and hearer, through cooperation and negotiation, for example about the proper defini tion or Interpretation of a word, or determination of the refer ence of an expression. expression is true in the situation. More briefly: the intension of a sentence is the set of conditions that has to be satisfied in some possible world for the sentence to be true in that world.
Model-theretic semantics is fundamentally intensional, and it represents intensions by means of predicate calculus formulae.
In Situation semantics (Barwise 6 Perry 1983) , meaning is a rela tion between types of situations. This view stems from the recog nition that although there is a principled difference between 'natural' carriers of meaning ('signs'), and 'unnatural' or 'con ventional' carriers of meaning ('symbols') -illustrated by the difference between 'smoke means that something is burning' and '"something is burning" means that something is burning' -then both instances involve the transmission of information. Utterance situations, in other words, belong to a type of situation in which the transmission of information is based on symbols and their interpretation. Situation semantics is fundamentally extensional, and its representation of meaning is in fact a rep resentation of situation types, in a formal set theoretic nota tion. Such a narrower approach to the problem will have to set off from a set of assumptions specifically geared to, and delimiting, its s c o p e .
First of all, a distinction parallel to Searle's distinction be tween 'weak' and 'strong' artificial intelligence is called for within the computational study of language. 'Weak', or 'objec tive' computational linguistics is characterized by -regarding language as an object of study; -regarding the computer as a tool; -regarding a program as a hypothesis of language structure. 'weak' computational methods should enter into it (nature of the parsing required, level of morphological refinement, etc.).
-147 -Secondly, it is a limitation that computers, on the 'strong' view above, meaningfully enter into utterance situations only, indeed, utterance situations of an impoverished kind: there can (so far) be no reliance on suprasegmentals, no reliance on gestural or fa cial information, there is a limited range of language functions, etc. Thus, 'addressing' a computer is, invariably, an attempt to gain access to its universe of discourse, either with a view to changing it or to get documentation of its current state in the form of an appropriate responsive action. If this action is to be based on the computer's 'understanding' of the meaning of a nat ural language input, meaning in this context is a function from an utterance situation into a discourse universe. This assumption trades on a combination of the functional and relational views of meaning characterizing, respectively, model-theoretic and Situ ation semantics. It further enhances referential and conative meaning, but deliberately leaves out of account aspects of emo tive, phatic, metalingual, and poetic meaning.
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Thirdly, the process of 'understanding' is further segmented into a process of 'deciphering' and one of 'interpreting', in the fol lowing way: 'deciphering' is a function from an u t t e r a n c e to a universe of discourse on the grounds of the 'code', whereas 'in terpretation' is a function from one universe of discourse to another. 'Decipherment' will yield a rough approximation to what the hearer takes as the speaker's current universe of discourse, 'interpretation' will work on this to yield a universe of dis course more finegrained, and reflecting the hearer's conception of what the speaker 'has in mind'. Matters of poorly understood words or phrases will be dealt with by 'decipherment', matters of failing reference, inconsistency, etc. by 'interpretation'. 'In terpretation' in this framework is closely akin to the computa tional view of it (above, 3.1.), in that it involves one or more processes to be executed by the content of a universe of dis course . image of the world is a question which is in principle no differ ent from the question whether we can; it depends on whether our universe of discourse maps into a factual situation. And this in turn depends on the nature, quantity and quality of the k n ow led ge we had access to during its establishment. MIT: Cambr. Mass., 2nd
Edition 1985. 
